Articles By Chris Livingston The No-Chase Policy: A Perverse Incentive to Flee On July 30, 2007, Ronald Teague (a.k.a. the cat man) fled from Dallas County Constables. The chase was covered live on national television. Speeds neared 100 miles per hour and passed through Dallas, Richardson and Plano before finally ending. Dallas Police Officers were not, however, involved in the chase. In fact, reporters commented on DPD’s “no chase” policy several times during the television coverage. A recent decision from the United States Supreme Court clarifies that no legal reason precludes DPD from pursing those who flee. The case, Scott v. Harris, involved Victor Harris, then 19, who was observed traveling 73 miles per hour in a speed zone designated 55. When officers attempted to pull Harris over he sped away. A high-speed pursuit over dark and wet Georgia highways commenced. Deputy Sheriff Timothy Scott ended the pursuit by applying his push bumper to the back of Victor Harris’ Cadillac; sending Harris down an embankment and flipping the Cadillac. Harris was left a quadriplegic. He sued Deputy Scott in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging, inter alia, the use of excessive force resulting in an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. In an 8 to 1 decision, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Deputy Scott. The Supreme Court reviewed video from Deputy Harris’ dash camera and characterized the pursuit as “a Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening sort.” The Court noted that the pursuit put “police officers and innocent bystanders alike at great risk of serious injury.” This risk of injury is, no doubt, the rationale behind a no-chase policy. Chief Kunkle and other policymakers advocating the no-chase policy are also concerned about the City’s liability because of a 20-year-old Supreme Court case, Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), a case involving an officer who shot and killed an unarmed suspect who was attempting to escape on foot. Under the Garner test, the lower appeals court decided Deputy Scott’s use of deadly force was impermissible because Harris was not suspected of “a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, nor did Harris, prior to the chase, pose an imminent threat of serious physical harm to Scott or others.” Dallas Police Department General Order 301.07.D.3 uses this same imminent threat standard: “An officer may initiate a pursuit … When the officer has probable cause to believe that a felony involving the use or threat of physical force or violence has been, or is about to be, committed.” But the Supreme Court said this is ridiculous. The Supreme Court stated that “Garner had nothing to do with one car striking another or even with car chases.” Furthermore, the Court noted that “It was respondent, after all, who intentionally placed himself and the public in danger by unlawfully engaging in the reckless, high-speed flight that ultimately produced the choice between two evils that [Deputy] Scott confronted.” To those who claim that the public is equally protected by ceasing the pursuit, the Supreme Court had this to say: “Whereas Scott’s action—ramming respondent off the road—was certain to eliminate the risk that respondent posed to the public, ceasing pursuit was not. First of all, there would have been no way to convey convincingly to respondent that the chase was off, and that he was free to go. Had respondent looked in his rearview mirror and seen the police cars deactivate their flashing lights and turn around, he would have had no idea whether they were truly letting him get away, or simply devising a new strategy for capture.” Thus, the Supreme Court was “loath to lay down a rule requiring the police to allow fleeing suspects to get away whenever they drive so recklessly that they put other people’s lives in danger.” The new legal rule, if there ever was one to the contrary, is that when a suspect flees in a motor vehicle the police are constitutionally permitted to chase and crash the suspect. The culpability of the fleeing suspect when he chooses not to stop outweighs or offsets the deadly force used to crash the suspect. This is the only sure way to protect the public. After all, a fleeing suspect in a motor vehicle is effectively armed with a deadly weapon. The threat to the public is imminent the moment the suspect flees. A no-chase policy creates, again in the words of the Supreme Court, the “perverse incentive” that “every fleeing motorist would know that escape is within his grasp, if only he accelerates to 90 miles per hour, crosses the double-yellow line a few times, and runs a few red lights.” Chief Kunkle should re-examine the no-chase policy in light of the constitutional right police have to chase a fleeing suspect.
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